The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations (Record no. 21673)

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000 -LEADER
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003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
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005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
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008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
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020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 978-0521736602
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 338.501
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Spulber, Daniel F.
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York:
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2009.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xiii, 529p., ref., ind., 25 cm X 18 cm
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note Recommended by: Banikanta Mishra
521 ## - TARGET AUDIENCE NOTE
Target audience note Content:<br/><br/>PART I. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM<br/>1 The Consumer 11<br/>1.1 The Intermediation Hypothesis and the Scope of the Firm 12<br/>1.2 Consumer Characteristics 26<br/>1.3 Consumer Cooperation and Transaction Benefits 28<br/>1.4 Consumer Coordination and Transaction Costs 35<br/>1.5 Consumer Organizations and the Separation Criterion 40<br/>1.6 Conclusions 61<br/>2 The Firm 63<br/>2.1 The Separation Criterion 64<br/>2.2 Firms Create and Manage Markets 76<br/>2.3 Firms Create and Manage Organizations 88<br/>2.4 The Development of the Firm 102<br/>2.5 The Social, Legal, and Political Context of the Firm 117<br/>2.6 Conclusions 123<br/>3 The Separation of Consumer Objectives and Firm Objectives 125<br/>3.1 The Neoclassical Separation Theorem 127<br/>3.2 The Separation Theorem with Price-Setting Firms 132<br/>3.3 The Fisher Separation Theorem 136<br/>3.4 The Fisher Separation Theorem with Price-Setting Firms 142<br/>3.5 Conclusions 147<br/>PART II. THE ENTREPRENEUR IN EQUILIBRIUM<br/>4 The Entrepreneur 151<br/>4.1 A Dynamic Theory of the Entrepreneur 153<br/>4.2 The Entrepreneur’s Decisions and the Foundational Shift 163<br/>4.3 Type I Competition: Competition among Entrepreneurs 175<br/>4.4 Type II Competition: Competition between Entrepreneurs and Consumer Organizations 177<br/>4.5 Type III Competition: Competition between Entrepreneurs and Established Firms 179<br/>4.6 The Classical Theory of the Entrepreneur 186<br/>4.7 Conclusions 196<br/>5 Competition among Entrepreneurs 197<br/>5.1 Set-Up Costs 198<br/>5.2 Investment 205<br/>5.3 Time Preferences 212<br/>5.4 Risky Projects 214<br/>5.5 Risk Aversion 219<br/>5.6 Endowments and Incentives for Effort 223<br/>5.7 Conclusions 226<br/>PART III. HUMAN CAPITAL, FINANCIAL CAPITAL, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRM<br/>6 Human Capital and the Organization of the Firm 231<br/>6.1 The Worker Cooperative versus the Firm 232<br/>6.2 Hiring Workers with Diverse Abilities 237<br/>6.3 Hiring with Moral Hazard in Teams 242<br/>6.4 Market Contracts versus Organizational Contracts 247<br/>6.5 Hiring by the Firm versus a Cooperative with Open<br/>Membership 256<br/>6.6 Conclusions 262<br/>7 Financial Capital and the Organization of the Firm 263<br/>7.1 The Basic Model 264<br/>7.2 The Corporation in Equilibrium 268<br/>7.3 The Partnership in Equilibrium 276<br/>7.4 Market Equilibrium and Organizational Form 283<br/>7.5 Conclusions 290<br/>PART IV. INTERMEDIATION BY THE FIRM<br/>8 The Firm as Intermediary in the Pure-Exchange Economy 295<br/>8.1 The Firm and Money 296<br/>8.2 The Firm and the Absence of a Double Coincidence of Wants 302<br/>8.3 The Firm and Market Clearing 308<br/>8.4 The Firm and Time 310<br/>8.5 The Firm and Distance 315<br/>8.6 The Firm and Risk 322<br/>8.7 Conclusions 328<br/>9 The Firm versus Free Riding 329<br/>9.1 The Firm and Economies of Scale 331<br/>9.2 The Firm and Public Goods 347<br/>9.3 The Firm and Common-Property Resources 355<br/>9.4 Conclusions 362<br/>PART V. MARKET MAKING BY THE FIRM<br/>10 The Firm Creates Markets 367<br/>10.1 Market Making and Matchmaking by the Firm:<br/>Overview 368<br/>10.2 Market Making by the Firm versus Consumer Search 380<br/>10.3 Matchmaking by the Firm versus Consumer Search 388<br/>10.4 Competition between Market-Making Firms 391<br/>10.5 Competition between Market-Making Firms:<br/>Characterization of Equilibrium 404<br/>10.6 Conclusions 415<br/>11 The Firm in the Market for Contracts 417<br/>11.1 Contracts and Incentives to Invest: Firms Create<br/>Markets 419<br/>11.2 Moral Hazard: Firm Management of Tournaments<br/>versus Bilateral Agency Contracts 440<br/>11.3 Adverse Selection: The Firm Monitors Performance 447<br/>11.4 Adverse Selection: The Firm Certifies Quality 451<br/>11.5 Conclusions 456<br/>12 Conclusion 458<br/>12.1 The Firm 458<br/>12.2 The Entrepreneur 460<br/>12.3 The Intermediation Hypothesis 462<br/>12.4 Markets and Organizations 463<br/>
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
General subdivision industrial organization
-- economic theory
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type Books
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Date acquired Source of acquisition Cost, normal purchase price Inventory number Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Cost, replacement price Price effective from Koha item type
    Dewey Decimal Classification     KEIC KEIC 09/26/2023 Astha Book Agency 2743.90 2023-2024/IN17020   338.501 SPU 22584 09/30/2023 10735.00 09/26/2023 Books
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