The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations (Record no. 21673)
[ view plain ]
000 -LEADER | |
---|---|
fixed length control field | 04285 a2200193 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20231005121932.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 230930b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
International Standard Book Number | 978-0521736602 |
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
Classification number | 338.501 |
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Spulber, Daniel F. |
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York: |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2009. |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
Extent | xiii, 529p., ref., ind., 25 cm X 18 cm |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | Recommended by: Banikanta Mishra |
521 ## - TARGET AUDIENCE NOTE | |
Target audience note | Content:<br/><br/>PART I. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM<br/>1 The Consumer 11<br/>1.1 The Intermediation Hypothesis and the Scope of the Firm 12<br/>1.2 Consumer Characteristics 26<br/>1.3 Consumer Cooperation and Transaction Benefits 28<br/>1.4 Consumer Coordination and Transaction Costs 35<br/>1.5 Consumer Organizations and the Separation Criterion 40<br/>1.6 Conclusions 61<br/>2 The Firm 63<br/>2.1 The Separation Criterion 64<br/>2.2 Firms Create and Manage Markets 76<br/>2.3 Firms Create and Manage Organizations 88<br/>2.4 The Development of the Firm 102<br/>2.5 The Social, Legal, and Political Context of the Firm 117<br/>2.6 Conclusions 123<br/>3 The Separation of Consumer Objectives and Firm Objectives 125<br/>3.1 The Neoclassical Separation Theorem 127<br/>3.2 The Separation Theorem with Price-Setting Firms 132<br/>3.3 The Fisher Separation Theorem 136<br/>3.4 The Fisher Separation Theorem with Price-Setting Firms 142<br/>3.5 Conclusions 147<br/>PART II. THE ENTREPRENEUR IN EQUILIBRIUM<br/>4 The Entrepreneur 151<br/>4.1 A Dynamic Theory of the Entrepreneur 153<br/>4.2 The Entrepreneur’s Decisions and the Foundational Shift 163<br/>4.3 Type I Competition: Competition among Entrepreneurs 175<br/>4.4 Type II Competition: Competition between Entrepreneurs and Consumer Organizations 177<br/>4.5 Type III Competition: Competition between Entrepreneurs and Established Firms 179<br/>4.6 The Classical Theory of the Entrepreneur 186<br/>4.7 Conclusions 196<br/>5 Competition among Entrepreneurs 197<br/>5.1 Set-Up Costs 198<br/>5.2 Investment 205<br/>5.3 Time Preferences 212<br/>5.4 Risky Projects 214<br/>5.5 Risk Aversion 219<br/>5.6 Endowments and Incentives for Effort 223<br/>5.7 Conclusions 226<br/>PART III. HUMAN CAPITAL, FINANCIAL CAPITAL, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRM<br/>6 Human Capital and the Organization of the Firm 231<br/>6.1 The Worker Cooperative versus the Firm 232<br/>6.2 Hiring Workers with Diverse Abilities 237<br/>6.3 Hiring with Moral Hazard in Teams 242<br/>6.4 Market Contracts versus Organizational Contracts 247<br/>6.5 Hiring by the Firm versus a Cooperative with Open<br/>Membership 256<br/>6.6 Conclusions 262<br/>7 Financial Capital and the Organization of the Firm 263<br/>7.1 The Basic Model 264<br/>7.2 The Corporation in Equilibrium 268<br/>7.3 The Partnership in Equilibrium 276<br/>7.4 Market Equilibrium and Organizational Form 283<br/>7.5 Conclusions 290<br/>PART IV. INTERMEDIATION BY THE FIRM<br/>8 The Firm as Intermediary in the Pure-Exchange Economy 295<br/>8.1 The Firm and Money 296<br/>8.2 The Firm and the Absence of a Double Coincidence of Wants 302<br/>8.3 The Firm and Market Clearing 308<br/>8.4 The Firm and Time 310<br/>8.5 The Firm and Distance 315<br/>8.6 The Firm and Risk 322<br/>8.7 Conclusions 328<br/>9 The Firm versus Free Riding 329<br/>9.1 The Firm and Economies of Scale 331<br/>9.2 The Firm and Public Goods 347<br/>9.3 The Firm and Common-Property Resources 355<br/>9.4 Conclusions 362<br/>PART V. MARKET MAKING BY THE FIRM<br/>10 The Firm Creates Markets 367<br/>10.1 Market Making and Matchmaking by the Firm:<br/>Overview 368<br/>10.2 Market Making by the Firm versus Consumer Search 380<br/>10.3 Matchmaking by the Firm versus Consumer Search 388<br/>10.4 Competition between Market-Making Firms 391<br/>10.5 Competition between Market-Making Firms:<br/>Characterization of Equilibrium 404<br/>10.6 Conclusions 415<br/>11 The Firm in the Market for Contracts 417<br/>11.1 Contracts and Incentives to Invest: Firms Create<br/>Markets 419<br/>11.2 Moral Hazard: Firm Management of Tournaments<br/>versus Bilateral Agency Contracts 440<br/>11.3 Adverse Selection: The Firm Monitors Performance 447<br/>11.4 Adverse Selection: The Firm Certifies Quality 451<br/>11.5 Conclusions 456<br/>12 Conclusion 458<br/>12.1 The Firm 458<br/>12.2 The Entrepreneur 460<br/>12.3 The Intermediation Hypothesis 462<br/>12.4 Markets and Organizations 463<br/> |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
General subdivision | industrial organization |
-- | economic theory |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Source of classification or shelving scheme | Dewey Decimal Classification |
Koha item type | Books |
Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Date acquired | Source of acquisition | Cost, normal purchase price | Inventory number | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Barcode | Date last seen | Cost, replacement price | Price effective from | Koha item type |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dewey Decimal Classification | KEIC | KEIC | 09/26/2023 | Astha Book Agency | 2743.90 | 2023-2024/IN17020 | 338.501 SPU | 22584 | 09/30/2023 | 10735.00 | 09/26/2023 | Books |